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Vulnerability	of	international	freight	flows	to	shipping	network	disruptions:	a	multiplex	network	
perspective	
Abstract	
As	freight	flows	through	global	supply	chains	intensify,	dependence	upon	maritime	transportation	
increases.	This	paper	explores	the	risks	that	international	freight	flows	are	exposed	to	as	a	function	of	
the	multiple	complex	structure	of	liner	shipping	networks.	Based	on	network	modelling	of	over	80	
networks	and	simulation	of	attacks	to	seven	strategic	nodes	in	the	Americas,	the	paper	shows	that	the	
vulnerability	of	international	freight	flows	to	disruptions	in	maritime	transportation	services	varies	
according	to	the	country	of	origin	of	such	flows	and	the	role	that	the	country	plays	in	the	multi-layered	
maritime	transportation	network.		
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1. Introduction	
During	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	international	trade	in	goods	grew	twice	as	fast	as	world	
output,	driven	by	globalisation,	trade	liberalisation,	delocalisation	of	production	activities,	vertical	
integration,	lower	transportation	costs	and	the	use	of	information	technologies	in	international	business	
and	production	(Blonigen	and	Wilson,	2013).	Supply	chains	became	more	international	and	complex,	
encompassing	numerous	actors,	processes,	products	and	locations	(Myers	et	al.,	2006;	Creazza	et	al.,	
2010;	Wagner	and	Neshat,	2010;	Christopher	and	Holweg,	2011).	In	this	context,	a	variety	of	risks	
threatens	to	disrupt	the	smooth	flow	of	international	materials	and	final	products	along	supply	chains,	
with	severe	potential	consequences	for	international	business	(Bogataj	and	Bogataj,	2007;	Tang	and	
Musa,	2011).	Each	day	that	a	product	is	delayed	reduces	the	possibility	of	it	being	traded	by	1%	(6%	
when	products	are	time-sensitive)	(Djankov	et	al,	2010)	and	reduces	its	value	by	0.8%	(Hummels	and	
Schaur,	2013).		
Among	the	main	risks	global	supply	chains	face	are	disruptions	in	the	flow	of	goods	transported	
internationally.	Lack	of	adequate	infrastructure	and	transport	services,	failure	of	critical	infrastructure,	
adverse	weather	conditions,	cumbersome	customs	processes,	and	labor	conflicts,	among	others,	can	
increase	logistics	costs	and	raise	uncertainty	in	already	complex	environments.	As	a	result,	the	efficiency	
of	the	international	transport	chain	has	become	critical	for	supply	risk	management	and	performance.	
Among	transport	modes,	the	literature	in	this	regard	has	paid	particular	attention	to	the	international	
shipping	mode.	Indeed,	maritime	transportation	is	the	dominant	mode	of	transport	in	international	
trade,	with	around	80%	of	global	trade	by	volume	and	over	70%	of	global	trade	by	value	carried	by	
sea	and	handled	by	ports	worldwide	(UNCTAD,	2015).	These	large	shares	suggest	that	ports	(as	nodes)	
and	shipping	services	(as	links)	play	an	important	role	in	many	global	supply	chains	(Notteboom	and	
Rodrigue,	2005;	Mangan	et	al.,	2008;	Panayides	and	Song,	2008).	Because	of	this,	a	large	body	of	
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literature	advocates	for	port-supply	chain	integration,	suggesting	that	sharing	information	between	a	
port	and	other	supply	chain	actors	contributes	to	reduced	order	cycle	times,	a	cut	in	inventories	and	
more	flexible	systems	(Panayides	and	Song,	2013;	Woo	et	al.,	2013).			
Despite	this	increasing	attention	and	the	relevance	of	maritime	transportation	for	global	supply	chains,	
the	extent	to	which	the	configuration	of	liner	shipping	networks	may	affect	the	international	flow	of	
materials	and	final	products	remains	largely	unexplored.	Literature	in	the	areas	of	Transport	Geography	
and	Transport	Economics	that	analysed	the	characteristics	of	transport	networks	showed	that	the	
structure	of	shipping	routes	does	not	entirely	overlap	trade	patterns	(Ducruet	and	Notteboom,	2012;	
Calatayud	et	al.,	2017).	In	this	context,	the	research	question	investigated	in	this	paper	can	thus	be	
summarised	as	‘to	what	extent	does	the	specific	configuration	of	shipping	networks	create	risks	for	
international	freight	flows.	Indeed,	the	strategies	of	shipping	lines	and	the	different	positions	that	ports	
and	countries	may	have	in	the	maritime	network	can	play	an	important	role	in	smoothing	or	hampering	
international	freight	flows	across	global	supply	chains.	The	contribution	of	this	paper	to	the	literature	is	
twofold:	(1)	it	uncovers	the	structure	of	liner	shipping	networks	and	the	risks	they	may	pose	to	
international	freight	flows,	and	(2)	it	does	so	by	applying	multiple	complex	network	analysis,	a	technique	
that	scholars	recently	started	applying	to	air	transportation,	but	that	still	remains	largely	underused	in	
maritime	transportation.	The	results	of	this	paper	may	be	useful	not	only	for	researchers,	but	also	for	
practitioners	in	both	private	and	public	sectors.	Having	a	better	understanding	on	the	risks	that	the	
structure	of	liner	shipping	networks	may	pose	to	international	trade	flows	may	help	design	more	
efficient	risk	management	strategies	for	international	freight	flows,	as	well	as	provide	input	for	
transportation,	trade	and	infrastructure	investment	strategies	in	the	public	sector.			
The	paper	is	organised	as	follows:	Section	2	presents	the	literature	review;	Section	3	presents	the	
methodology;	Section	4	presents	the	results	and	discusses	the	implications	for	academic	research	and	
policy-making;	and	Section	5	presents	the	conclusions	of	this	research.	
	
	
2. Literature	review	
Risks	can	be	defined	as	the	combination	of	the	probability	of	occurrence	of	an	event	and	its	negative	
consequences	(Holton,	2004).	In	the	context	of	international	freight,	this	could	mean	any	risk	that	
prevents	goods	with	origin	in	a	given	country	from	reaching	their	destination	markets.	With	the	
accelerated	growth	of	international	trade	and	the	emergence	of	global	supply	chains,	dependency	on	
transportation	has	increased	(Tang	and	Musa,	2011).	Among	transportation	modes,	shipping	has	
emerged	as	the	backbone	of	globalisation	and	international	trade	(Creazza	et	al.,	2010).	While	the	
development	of	containerization	has	certainly	allowed	countries	and	firms	to	improve	efficiency	and	
reliability	in	their	international	trading	links,	it	has	exposed	them	to	a	new	type	of	risk:	disruptions	in	
maritime	transport	networks	(Acciaro	and	Serra,	2013).	Adverse	weather	conditions,	natural	disasters,	
terrorist	attacks,	regulatory	barriers,	and	changes	in	shipping	companies’	strategies	are	among	the	main	
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factors	that	can	create	disruptions	in	maritime	transportation	(Ducruet	et	al.,	2010;	Earnest	et	al.,	2012).	
For	example,	the	decision	following	the	2011	Fukushima	Daiichi	disaster	to	close	the	ports	of	Yokohama	
and	Tokyo	led	Japanese	exports,	and	particularly	its	auto	parts	supply	chains	to	a	halt	that	cost	Toyota	
alone	an	estimated	US$73	million	per	day	with	knock-on	effects	to	automobile	manufacturers	around	
the	world	(Earnest	et	al.,	2012).	More	recently,	the	filing	for	bankruptcy	of	Hanjin	shipping	line	–	the	
world’s	seventh-largest	container	line	–	in	August	2016	created	confusion	in	ports	and	firms	around	the	
world.	Millions	of	dollars’	worth	of	merchandise	sat	on	vessels	seized	on	behalf	of	creditors,	denied	
entry	to	ports	or	left	unable	to	dock,	while	firms	tried	to	make	alternative	arrangements	to	meet	
contractual	obligations	with	their	clients	and	minimise	the	financial	impact	of	supply	chain	disruptions	
(The	Guardian,	2016).		
Given	the	importance	of	maritime	transportation	for	the	smooth	flow	of	international	trade	and	the	
efficient	performance	of	global	supply	chains,	the	structure	of	shipping	transportation	business	and	the	
strategies	adopted	by	liner	shipping	companies	have	drawn	the	attention	of	both	supply	chain	and	
transportation	researchers	(Lam	and	Yap,	2011).	According	to	the	literature	that	explored	the	
determinants	of	port	choice	for	liner	shipping	services,	port	choice	is	a	function	of	the	overall	network	
cost	and	performance	(Mangan	et	al.,	2001;	Ducruet	and	Notteboom,	2012).	Shipping	lines	face	a	trade-
off	between	the	requirements	of	the	customers,	who	demand	direct	services	between	ports	of	origin	
and	destination	of	their	products,	and	operational	cost	considerations	leading	shipping	companies	to	
optimise	ship	utilisation	and	take	advantage	of	scale	economies	in	vessel	size	(Feng	et	al.,	2012).	
Balancing	the	trade-off	between	supply	and	demand,	shipping	companies	design	their	service	routes	in	
terms	of:	(i)	the	liner	service	type,	(ii)	the	number	and	order	of	port	calls	in	combination	with	the	actual	
port	selection	process,	(iii)	vessel	speed,	(iv)	frequency	and	(v)	vessel	size	and	fleet	mix	(Notteboom,	
2006;	Christiansen	et	al.,	2013).		
With	the	aim	of	improving	efficiency	and	profitability,	many	shipping	companies	have	adopted	the	
strategy	of	hub-and-spoke	networks,	where	the	lowest	cost	for	the	entire	network	is	achieved	by	
routing	via	hubs,	the	use	of	different	types	of	vessels	in	the	network	for	optimal	ship	utilisation,	and	the	
amalgamation	of	flows	to	benefit	from	scale	economies	in	maritime	transportation	(Fremont	and	Soppe,	
2004;	Fremont,	2007;	Imai	et	al.,	2009;	Gelareh	et	al.,	2010;	Meng	and	Wang,	2011;	Moon	et	al.,	2015).	
The	hub-and-spoke	configuration	has	created	a	hierarchy	among	ports,	with	shipping	companies	having	
different	functions	in	the	network.	Among	these	are	ports	dedicated	to	transhipment	and/or	
relay/interlining,	located	in	strategic	geographic	positions,	which	multiply	shipping	options	and	improve	
connectivity	within	the	network	through	their	pivotal	role	in	regional	hub-and-spoke	networks	(Ducruet	
and	Notteboom,	2012;	Ducruet,	2017).		
Research	on	the	structure	of	maritime	networks	and	liner	shipping	strategies	has	benefited	from	the	
adoption	of	network	analysis	where,	with	the	assistance	of	advanced	analytical	software,	maritime	
connections	are	abstracted	into	graphs	made	of	nodes	and	links.	Elements	of	graph	theory	are	used	to	
uncover	the	properties	and	laws	governing	maritime	networks,	as	well	as	their	internal	efficiencies	and	
vulnerabilities	(Ducruet	and	Lugo,	2011),	improving	available	knowledge	in	the	field	obtained	using	
other	methods	like	gravity	models	(Kaluza	et	al.,	2010)	or	variables	such	as	total	traffic	volume	(Xu	et	al.,	
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2015).	Indeed,	studies	applying	network	analysis	showed	that	the	container	shipping	network	shared	
the	characteristics	of	other	networks	found	in	nature	and	sciences:	(i)	it	was	a	scale-free	network,	where	
a	limited	number	of	nodes	were	highly	connected	and	links	among	nodes	were	distributed	according	to	
a	power-law	distribution	(Barabasi	and	Albert,	1999);	(ii)	it	was	a	‘small-world’	network,	with	high	cluster	
densities	among	nodes	(Watts	and	Strogatz,	1998);	and	(iii)	a	giant	component	could	be	found	in	the	
network,	to	which	almost	all	nodes	belonged	to.	In	addition,	the	particular	configuration	of	maritime	
networks	led	scholars	to	suggest	that	they	did	not	entirely	overlap	trade	patterns	but	they	followed	the	
economic	organisation	of	shipping	lines	(Hu	and	Zhu,	2009;	Ducruet	et	al.,	2010;	Ducruet	and	Lugo,	
2011;	Ducruet	and	Noteboom,	2012;	Ducruet	and	Zaidi,	2012;	Ducruet,	2016a;	Calatayud	et	al.,	2017).		
Network	analysis	has	also	been	applied	to	study	the	vulnerability	and	resilience	of	maritime	shipping	
networks.	Lhomme	(2016)	assessed	the	vulnerability	of	the	world	maritime	network	to	a	single	node	
breakdown	as	well	as	to	the	removal	of	a	group	of	nodes.	The	author	showed	that	even	though	the	
world	maritime	network	was	relatively	resilient,	it	was	quite	vulnerable	to	the	breakdown	of	the	most	
important	ports,	particularly	those	located	in	Asia.	He	also	showed	that	some	European	ports	were	
more	critical	than	expected.	Ducruet	(2016b)	analysed	the	dependency	of	the	world	maritime	network	
on	the	Panama	and	Suez	canals,	and	estimated	the	effects	of	removing	canal-dependent	flows	from	the	
network.	He	concluded	that	while	there	was	a	decreasing	importance	of	canal	shipping	in	the	context	of	
growing	south-south	trade	exchanges,	certain	areas	remained	more	dependent	on	canal	flows	than	
others,	such	as	Asia,	Europe,	and	North	America.	
Recently,	literature	in	the	Transportation	field	has	started	using	multiple	complex	networks	(also	
referred	to	as	multiplex	networks),	to	deepen	the	understanding	of	networks	structures	(Cardillo	et	al.,	
2013).	Studies	applying	multiplex	networks	aim	at	uncovering	the	multiple	relations	between	nodes.	
Relations	between	nodes	may	be	based	on	different	criteria,	each	criterion	represented	as	a	layer	in	a	
multi-layer	network.	According	to	each	criterion,	nodes	may	take	different	positions	within	a	network	
(De	Domenico	et	al.,	2015).	In	the	field	of	air	transportation,	available	studies	showed	that	the	air	
transport	network	was	a	multilayer	network	as	the	result	of	the	aggregation	of	airline	route	networks	
(Lordan	et	al.,	2014).	Compared	to	a	single	layer	network,	such	a	structure	strongly	increased	the	
resilience	of	the	system	-	defined	as	the	ability	of	a	network	to	cope	with	a	disruptive	event	(Sheffi,	
2005;	Cardillo	et	al.,	2013)	-	and	thus	enhanced	network	connectivity.	In	the	case	of	maritime	
transportation,	Kaluza	et	al.	(2010)	suggested	that	the	global	shipping	network	was	a	multi-layered	
structure	of	three	classes	of	cargo	ships	–	container	ships,	bulk	dry	carriers	and	oil	tankers	–	that	
spanned	distinct	subnetworks.	In	turn,	Ducruet	(2013	and	2017)	analysed	the	different	relationships	and	
dynamics	between	ports	according	to	five	categories	of	vessels:	solid	bulk,	liquid	bulk,	container,	general	
cargo,	and	passenger/vehicles.		
These	results	suggest	that,	although	of	relatively	recent	use,	multiplex	networks	can	provide	interesting	
results	to	understand	the	complexity	of	transport	systems.	There	is	however	no	study	available	on	the	
multiple	layers	of	the	maritime	network	based	on	the	liner	shipping	companies’	strategies.	This	research	
contributes	addressing	this	gap	via	understanding	the	degree	of	dependency	and	vulnerability	that	
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international	freight	flows	may	face	as	a	result	of	the	specific	characteristic	of	the	multiplex	network	in	
maritime	transportation.		
	
3. Methods	
The	research	question	we	posit	for	investigation	is	‘to	what	extent	does	the	specific	configuration	of	
shipping	networks	create	risks	for	international	freight	flows.	To	address	this	question,	multiple	complex	
network	analysis	is	used	to	uncover	and	model	the	structure	of	liner	shipping	services.	As	evidenced	in	
the	literature,	each	shipping	company	designs	its	network	seeking	to	minimise	overall	network	costs	and	
maximise	network	performance	(Mangan	et	al.,	2001;	Ducruet	and	Notteboom,	2012).		In	particular	
Because	of	this,	port	choices	and	network	configurations	often	differ	among	shipping	lines.	When	nodes	
are	connected	according	to	different	criteria	–	in	this	case,	the	different	strategies	adopted	by	shipping	
lines	to	design	their	route	networks–	multiplex	networks	better	fit	the	real	situation,	catching	the	
different	dynamics	developing	in	each	layer	of	the	multiple	complex	network	(Cardillo	et	al.,	2013;	Kivela	
et	al.,	2014;	Ducruet,	2017).	Therefore,	we	apply	multiplex	network	analysis	to	build	the	multiplex	
shipping	network	–	that	is,	the	network	of	maritime	connections	among	ports	that	results	from	the	sum	
of	individual	liner	shipping	companies’	networks	–	and	explore	dependency	and	vulnerability	for	global	
supply	chains	emerging	from	structure	of	such	multiplex	shipping	network.		
Due	to	the	predominance	of	containerisation	and	maritime	transportation	in	international	trade,	the	
focus	of	this	paper	is	on	containerships	and	liner	shipping	services.	Indeed,	about	70%	of	world	trade	
value	is	transported	on	containerships,	making	liner	shipping	the	most	important	mode	of	maritime	
transportation	(Windeck,	2012).	One	geographic	region	was	selected	for	applying	the	approach	
proposed,	the	Americas	(encompassing	North,	Central	and	South	America,	and	the	Caribbean),	which	
includes	32	countries[1]	and	shows	high	intensity	of	intra-regional	trade	flows.	Intra-regional	trade	in	the	
Americas	accounts	for	about	53%	of	the	total	value	of	the	region’s	international	trade	flows.	
Approximately	74%	of	the	commodities	traded	intra-regionally	are	traded	by	sea.	Thus,	the	maritime	
transport	network	is	clearly	one	crucial	aspect	for	intra-regional	trade.		
Given	that	the	purpose	of	this	paper	is	primarily	to	analyse	the	risks	and	vulnerability	that	international	
freight	flows	may	face	as	a	result	of	the	specific	structure	of	the	multiplex	shipping	network,	and	not	the	
trends	and	evolution	of	the	network,	data	was	collected	for	one	point	in	time	only.	While	analysing	
changes	in	the	structure	of	multiplex	shipping	networks	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper,	recent	studies	
have	evidenced	the	generally	static	and	unchanging	structure	of	such	shipping	networks	at	the	macro	
(country	and	global)	level	(Ducruet,	2017).	Following	a	detailed	analysis	on	data	availability	and	validity,	
the	year	2011	was	selected	for	the	analysis.	Within	the	period	2010-2014	(the	last	five	years	of	available	
data),	2011	was	selected	as	it	was	the	most	stable	year	in	the	Americas	in	terms	of	economic	and	
weather	factors,	since	there	were	neither	trade	shocks	nor	major	natural	disasters	in	the	Americas	in	
2011	that	affected	trade	and	transport	flows	significantly	within	the	region.		
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In	order	to	understand	to	what	extent	the	multiplex	shipping	network	creates	risks	international	freight	
flows	in	the	Americas,	we	first	built	and	analysed	the	structure	of	the	overall	shipping	network,	including	
all	shipping	services.	We	labelled	this	network	the	Maritime	Shipping	Network	or	‘MSN’.	Next,	we	
analysed	the	network	structure	of	the	most	important	shipping	lines	in	the	Americas.	Given	that	the	
MSN	comprises	the	individual	networks	of	liner	shipping	companies,	and	that	countries	are	served	in	
different	ways	by	shipping	lines,	this	step	is	important	to	understand	the	structure	of	those	shipping	
lines	and	to	what	extent	international	freight	flows	between	countries	in	the	Americas	depend	on	the	
different	shipping	lines.	Finally,	to	understand	how	vulnerable	the	multiplex	shipping	network	in	the	
Americas	may	be	to	attacks	to	critical	hubs,	and	how	those	attacks	could	affect	international	freight	
flows	within	the	region,	we	simulated	‘attacks’	to	the	most	important	seven	countries	in	the	MSN.	These	
steps	are	summarised	in	Figure	1	and	further	explained	in	the	paragraphs	below.		
	
	
	
	
Figure	1.	Diagram	illustrating	the	methodology	applied	
	
To	build	the	multiplex	shipping	network,	data	on	both	intra	and	extra	liner	shipping	services	in	the	
Americas	was	gathered	from	Containerization	International	(2012),	for	the	32	countries	and	the	139	
container	ports	located	in	them.	These	data	were	inputted	into	Gephi,	an	open	software	for	network	
visualisation	and	analysis	(Bastian	et	al.,	2009),	to	produce	the	Maritime	Shipping	Network	or	‘MSN’,	
which	can	be	defined	as	the	directed	network	of	all	shipping	services	calling	at	ports	in	the	Americas.	
Unlike	most	of	the	available	literature	(Kaluza	et	al.,	2010;	Ducruet	and	Notteboom,	2012;	Pais	et	al.,	
2012)	which	use	undirected	networks,	this	paper	takes	into	account	the	directionality	of	links.	Indeed,	
due	to	the	differences	in	shipping	service	routing,	the	number	and	weight	of	links	between	countries	i	
and	j	is	frequently	not	the	same	as	between	countries	j	and	i.	Therefore,	in	order	to	more	accurately	
reflect	the	reality	of	shipping	services,	both	inbound	and	outbound	services	were	considered,	allowing	
us	to	build	an	asymmetric	matrix	for	network	analysis	and	better	understand	the	structure	of	the	
maritime	network.	The	MSN	contained	2,028	links	between	country	pairs.	Variables	on	the	availability	–	
number	of	connections	–	and	the	quality	–	the	frequency	and	capacity	of	connections	–	of	maritime	
transport	services	were	used	to	measure	the	strength	of	such	links	(Burghouwt	and	Redondi,	2013).	For	
each	country,	data	was	gathered	on	containership	deployment,	container	carrying	capacity,	and	service	
PLEASE	CITE	THIS	PAPER	AS	Calatayud,	A.,	Mangan,	J.	and	Palacin,	R.	(2017)	'Vulnerability	of	
international	freight	flows	to	shipping	network	disruptions:	A	multiplex	network	perspective',	
Transportation	Research	Part	E:	Logistics	and	Transportation	Review,	108,	pp.	195-208.	
	
7	
	
frequency	(Wilmsmeier	et	al.,	2006;	Ducruet	and	Notteboom,	2012).	These	variables	were	used	to	
estimate	the	strength	or	capacity	of	the	link	for	the	country	pair	ij.	Links	were	weighted	according	to	the	
following	formula:		 𝑊"# = (𝑉'"#𝑄'"#𝐹'"#)+,-'./ 		 	 	 	 (1)	
where	Wij	was	total	weight	of	link	ij	–	the	link	joining	countries	i	and	j	–	and	measured	in	TEUs,	Nij	was	
the	total	number	of	services	in	link	ij,	𝑉'"# 	was	average	vessel	size	deployed	in	service	s	for	link	ij,	𝑄'"# 	was	
the	number	of	vessels	deployed	in	service	s	for	link	ij,	and	𝐹'"# 	was	the	annual	frequency	with	which	
service	s	links	two	given	countries	i	and	j.	Therefore,	the	total	weight	of	each	link	ij	was	the	result	of	the	
sum	of	all	services	s	deployed	between	countries	i	and	j.	According	to	Lam	and	Yap	(2011),	despite	the	
fact	that	detailed	information	on	the	actual	load	of	each	container	and	its	precise	origin	and	destination	
is	not	publicly	available,	this	way	of	calculating	links	weight	can	reveal	the	connectivity	between	
countries	in	a	systematic	and	quantifiable	manner.	Indeed,	the	literature	suggests	that	due	to	the	high	
correlation	between	container	throughput	and	port	hierarchies	measured	via	vessel	movements,	this	
can	be	a	reasonable	proxy	for	actual	links	weight	(Xu	et	al.,	2015).		
After	building	the	MSN	and	with	the	purpose	of	analysing	the	structure	of	the	multiplex	network	of	
maritime	shipping	lines	in	the	Americas,	the	top	(measured	by	TEU	capacity	as	per	Equation	1)	12	
shipping	lines	were	selected,	making	up	75%	of	total	TEU	capacity	available	in	the	region	in	2011	(Table	
1).		
	
Shipping	Line	
%	of	total	TEU	
capacity	in	the	
MSN	
MSC	 12	
Maersk	 9.6	
CSAV	 8.8	
CMA-CGM	 7.9	
Hamburg-Süd	 6.8	
Evergreen	 6.3	
Hapag-Lloyd	 5.9	
APL	 4.3	
ZIM	 4	
COSCO	 4	
NYK	 2.9	
MOL	 2.5	
Other	 25	
Total	 100	
Table	1.	Selected	liner	shipping	companies	
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Each	shipping	line’s	network	was	visualised	using	software	for	network	visualisation.	In	line	with	the	
multiplex	network	approach	applied	in	this	paper,	network	analysis	metrics	were	used	to	explore	the	
topology	of	each	shipping	line	network.	Given	that	network	metrics	analyse	network	characteristics	
from	a	different	perspective,	a	set	of	metrics	was	selected,	namely:	total	degree;	betweenness	
centrality;	clustering	coefficient;	beta	and	gamma	indices;	and	diameter.	Total	degree,	network	
diameter,	and	beta	and	gamma	indices	were	used	to	estimate	the	degree	of	completeness	of	each	
network.	Clustering	coefficient	was	used	to	estimate	the	degree	of	network	concentration.	Betweenness	
centralities	was	used	to	estimate	the	importance	of	a	node	in	a	network	(Wang	et	al.,	2011).	Analysing	
the	topology	of	the	network	is	important	to	understand	how	vulnerable	the	network	may	be	(Ducruet,	
2016b).	According	to	the	literature	in	Network	Science,	higher	network	completeness	–	higher	number	
of	total	links,	higher	clustering	coefficient	and	lower	network	diameter	–	decreases	network	
vulnerability	(Barabasi,	2016).	In	turn,	higher	links	concentration	and	disparity	in	links	distribution	may	
pose	higher	risks	to	network	connectivity	in	the	event	of	targeted	attacks	to	the	nodes	with	highest	
betweenness	centrality	(Albert	et	al.,	2000;	Woolley-Meza	et	al.,	2011).	
	
	
Table	2.	Network	metrics	
	
As	discussed	in	Section	2,	the	literature	in	maritime	transportation	shows	that	the	hub-and-spoke	
configuration	of	maritime	shipping	networks	renders	networks	more	vulnerable	to	targeted	attacks	on	
such	hubs	(Woolley-Meza	et	al.,	2011;	Lhomme,	2016).	To	understand	how	vulnerable	the	multiplex	
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shipping	network	in	the	Americas	may	be	to	attacks	to	critical	hubs	-	and	how	those	attacks	could	affect	
the	different	countries	and	their	international	freight	flows	-,	we	simulated	‘attacks’	to	the	seven	
countries	with	the	highest	betweenness	degree	in	the	MSN.	An	attack	to	a	country	made	the	country	
and	its	inbound	and	outbound	links	disappear	from	the	network.	Such	an	attack	implies	the	shutdown	of	
the	ports	in	a	country	and	could	be	caused	by,	for	example,	a	natural	disaster	(hurricane,	earthquake,	
etc.),	a	terrorist	attack,	political	or	civil	unrest,	or	infrastructure/technical	failures.	There	are	several	
examples	in	the	Americas	where	an	event	led	to	the	closure	of	container	ports	in	a	country.	Perhaps	the	
most	frequent	ones	in	the	region	are	related	to	extreme	weather	conditions,	such	as	Tropical	Storm	
Erika	in	2015,	which	led	to	port	closures	in	Dominican	Republic,	Haiti,	Dominica	and	most	of	the	small	
Caribbean	islands;	or	Hurricane	Matthew	in	2016,	which	brought	the	ports	of	Jamaica	and	Bahamas	to	a	
halt.	Strikes	are	other	events	that	have	affected	port	operations	in	the	region,	causing	for	example	the	
closure	of	ports	in	Panama	in	2012,	Trinidad	and	Tobago	in	2012,	and	Costa	Rica	in	2014.			
In	the	simulation,	an	attack	to	a	node	generated	an	adjustment	of	nodes’	links	and	position	in	the	MSN	
and	the	twelve	shipping	line	networks.	The	seven	countries	selected	for	the	simulation	were	the	ones	
with	the	highest	betweenness	in	the	MSN:	United	States	(US),	Panama,	Jamaica,	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	
Dominican	Republic	(DR),	Colombia	and	Brazil.	The	impact	of	a	targeted	attack	to	each	of	the	seven	
countries	was	studied	both	at	the	network	and	country	levels.	In	total,	70	simulations	–	seven	for	the	
MSN	with	the	removal	of	each	hub,	and	63	simulations	for	the	12	liner	companies	selected,	according	to	
whether	the	countries	attacked	were	part	of	their	networks	or	not	–		were	conducted,	generating	70	
new	networks.	The	set	of	network	metrics	presented	in	Table	2	was	used	to	analyse	the	impact	of	the	
targeted	attacks	on	both	the	MSN	and	each	shipping	line’s	network.	The	results	of	this	analysis	are	
detailed	in	the	next	section.	
	
4. Results	and	discussion	
The	MSN	–	the	single	layered	structure	of	the	maritime	shipping	network	in	the	Americas	–	was	built	
and	analysed	first.	Figure	2	shows	the	MSN	in	the	Americas.	In	line	with	evidence	from	the	literature	
that	analysed	the	global	maritime	network	(Hu	and	Zhu,	2009;	Kaluza	et	al.,	2010;	Ducruet	and	
Notteboom,	2012;	Ducruet,	2017),	the	MSN	presented	a	‘hub-and-spoke’	structure	and	tested	positive	
for	a	scale-free	network	with	a	power-law	distribution	of	network	links,	meaning	that	a	reduced	number	
of	countries	had	a	large	number	of	connections	and	that	connectivity	opportunities	were	unequally	
distributed	among	nodes	(Figure	3).	Capacity,	which	referred	to	links	weight	measured	as	per	equation	
(1),	was	also	unevenly	distributed	among	links	in	the	network.	Less	than	10%	of	the	links	concentrated	
90%	of	the	total	capacity	of	the	network.	As	shown	in	Figure	2,	the	links	between	US	and	Panama,	US	
and	Canada,	US	and	Jamaica,	and	Brazil	and	Argentina,	were	the	links	with	the	highest	weight	in	the	
network.		
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Figure	2.	MSN*	
*Node’s	size	according	to	betweenness	centrality.	Node’s	colour	according	to	maritime	community.	Links	weight	
according	to	capacity	of	shipping	connection	between	countries	(total	TEUs	in	2011).		
 
Figure	3.	Testing	for	power-law	distribution	in	the	MSN*	
	
*	A	quantity	x	obeys	a	power	law	if	it	is	drawn	from	a	probability	distribution	P(x)=Cx-α,	where	C	is	a	constant	
parameter	of	the	distribution	known	as	the	exponent	or	scaling	parameter.	The	scaling	parameter	typically	lies	in	
the	range	2	<	α	<	3	(Barabasi,	2016).	
	
Although	the	literature	has	evidenced	that	hub-and-spoke	networks	are	more	efficient	for	network	
connectivity	–	most	of	the	nodes	in	the	network	can	be	reached	within	a	few	hops	–	it	has	also	been	
shown	that	these	networks	are	more	vulnerable	to	targeted	attacks	(Albert	et	al.,	2000).	The	results	of	
the	network	metrics	(Table	2)	applied	to	the	MSN	evidenced	a	low	network	completeness,	with	a	beta	
index	of	11.22/31,	a	gamma	index	of	0.33/1,	a	diameter	of	3	and	an	average	clustering	coefficient	of	
P(x)=Cx-α	
α=2.63	
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0.63/1.	In	line	with	the	hub-and-spoke	organisation	of	the	MSN,	a	few	nodes	–	US,	Panama,	Jamaica,	
Trinidad	and	Tobago,	DR,	Colombia	and	Brazil	–	showed	higher	degree	and	betweenness	centralities.	A	
priori,	and	following	the	evidence	found	in	the	literature	(Albert	et	al.,	2000;	Woolley-Meza	et	al.,	2011),	
these	results	would	suggest	a	high	vulnerability	of	the	MSN	in	the	event	of	targeted	attacks	to	its	hubs.	
This	will	be	further	analysed	in	the	pages	that	follow	when	we	simulate	‘attacks’	to	selected	countries.	
The	analysis	of	the	origin	and	destination	of	links	in	the	MSN	showed	that	countries	in	the	network	were	
mainly	connected	to	their	geographic	neighbours	and	regional/global	hubs.	Figure	4	provides	a	
geographical	representation	of	the	main	MSN	linkages	that	illustrates	the	tight	geographical	connection.	
Taking	into	account	that	the	main	trade	partners	for	countries	in	the	region	are	the	US	and	Canada	
(Blyde,	2014),	the	‘hub-and-spoke’	structure	of	the	MSN	made	international	freight	flows	transit	through	
third	countries	before	getting	to	their	destination.	These	third	countries	were	neighbours	in	a	given	MSN	
community,	regional	connectors	and	global	hubs.	Four	communities	emerged	in	the	MSN:	(i)	a	
community	gathering	two	North	American	countries	(US	and	Canada)	with	countries	that	acted	as	
hemispheric	hubs	in	the	MSN	(Panama	and	Jamaica);	(ii)	a	community	gathering	countries	in	the	
Southern	Cone	with	shores	on	the	Atlantic	coast	(Brazil,	Argentina	and	Uruguay);	(iii)	a	community	
gathering	Caribbean	countries;	and	(iv)	a	community	gathering	countries	in	Central	America	and	the	
West	Coast	of	South	America	(WCSA)	(Figure	2).	Communities	were	identified	by	applying	the	‘Louvain	
method’	for	community	detection	in	Gephi	(Blondel	et	al.,	2008).	The	presence	of	communities	in	the	
MSN	can	certainly	provide	an	advantage	for	the	smoothness	of	freight	flows	between	countries	that	
belong	to	the	same	community,	ensuring	the	availability	of	frequent	shipping	services	among	them.	
However,	as	mentioned	above,	evidence	shows	that	often	global	supply	chains	in	the	Americas	link	
buyers	located	in	the	US	with	suppliers	located	in	the	rest	of	the	countries	(Blyde,	2014).	Under	these	
circumstances,	the	presence	of	communities	in	the	MSN	may	pose	challenges	for	the	seamless	
transportation	of	international	goods	between	trade	partners.	Indeed,	due	to	the	configuration	of	
shipping	services,	containerships	often	subsequently	call	at	ports	in	neighbouring	countries.	For	
example,	containerships	with	goods	exported	from	Chile,	often	had	to	call	first	at	ports	in	Peru	(Callao)	
and	Ecuador	(Guayaquil),	and	Colombia	(Buenaventura)	before	arriving	to	their	international	destination	
in	the	US.	Therefore,	the	performance	of	ports	and	the	business	environment	in	community	neighbours	
can	certainly	impact	the	smooth	flow	of	freight	between	international	trade	partners.		
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Figure	4.	Geographical	representation	of	the	main	MSN	linkages	
	
Among	community	neighbours,	certain	countries	played	a	more	critical	role	since	they	acted	as	
connectors	between	communities,	thus	allowing	countries	in	the	different	communities	to	be	connected	
not	only	to	their	neighbours,	but	also	to	countries	in	other	communities.	This	was	revealed	by	their	
higher	betweenness	centrality.	For	example,	Brazil	emerged	as	a	critical	connector	between	the	
Southern	Cone	community	and	the	rest	of	the	network.	Likewise,	Trinidad	and	Tobago	acted	as	the	
bridge	between	the	Caribbean	community	and	the	other	communities	in	the	MSN,	and	Colombia	played	
the	regional	hub	role	for	WCSA.	In	turn,	US,	Panama	and	Jamaica	acted	as	global	hubs	in	the	MSN.	Their	
presence	was	critical	for	global	connectivity	since	they	connected	to	different	communities,	to	global	
and	regional	hubs,	and	to	individual	countries,	enabling	connection	among	all	the	nodes	they	were	
connected	to.	Due	to	the	‘hub-and-spoke’	structure	of	the	MSN,	the	position	of	these	countries	as	global	
and	regional	hubs	provided	them	with	an	advantage	in	terms	of	reaching	their	trade	partners	in	the	
fastest	and	smoothest	way.	Indeed,	their	products	could	reach	their	destination	markets	with	fewer	
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steps	and	transhipments	than	the	products	of	firms	located	in	countries	with	a	less	central	position.	In	
contrast,	the	flow	of	products	from	more	peripheral	countries	in	the	MSN	depended	not	only	upon	
transport	reliability	in	the	given	country,	but	also	upon	events	occurring	in	regional	and	global	hubs,	as	
well	as	in	countries	in	the	same	community.	Therefore,	the	configuration	of	a	hub-and-spoke	network	
makes	the	international	freight	flows	of	peripheral	countries	more	exposed	to	disruption	risks	than	
those	of	other	countries	in	the	same	community,	regional	connectors	and	global	hubs.			
Having	analysed	the	MSN	in	the	Americas,	we	wanted	to	assess	the	extent	to	which	the	organisation	of	
the	multi-layered	shipping	network	posed	risks	to	international	freight	flows	in	the	Americas.	Figure	5	
shows	the	structure	of	the	12	main	shipping	lines	in	the	Americas.		
	
	
	
Figure	5.	Main	shipping	lines	in	the	Americas*	
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Figure	5.	Main	shipping	lines	in	the	Americas	(cont.)*	
*Nodes’size	and	labels	size	according	to	betweenness	centrality.	Links	weight	according	to	weight	of	connections	
between	countries.	Links	colour	according	to	community.		
	
The	network	analysis	metrics	selected	and	summarised	in	Table	2	were	used	to	explore	the	
characteristics	of	each	shipping	line	network	(Table	3).		
	 MSN	 APL	 CMA-CGM	 CSAV	 COSCO	 Evergreen	
Hamburg-
Süd	
Hapag-
Lloyd	 Maersk	 MOL	 MSC	 NYK	 ZIM	
Nodes	 34	 13	 29	 19	 4	 17	 17	 18	 20	 10	 11	 16	 9	
Total	
degree	 393	 32	 167	 111	 5	 52	 97	 102	 117	 22	 40	 47	 21	
Avg.	
cluster.	
coeff.	
0.639	 0.691	 0.605	 0.639	 0.292	 0.662	 0.637	 0.627	 0.66	 0.633	0.671	0.708	0.587	
Beta	
index	 11.22	 2.46	 5.75	 5.84	 1.25	 3.05	 5.706	 5.66	 5.85	 2.2	 3.63	 2.93	 2.33	
Gamma	
index	 0.33	 0.205	 0.206	 0.325	 0.417	 0.191	 0.357	 0.333	 0.308	 0.244	0.364	0.196	0.292	
Diameter	 3	 4	 4	 3	 2	 3	 4	 4	 4	 4	 4	 4	 4	
Table	3.	Multiplex	network	structure	of	the	MSN	
	
The	analysis	showed	that	network	properties	of	individual	liner	shipping	companies	differed	from	that	of	
the	MSN	and	among	themselves.	These	results	are	line	with	the	works	of	Kaluza	et	al.	(2010)	and	
Ducruet	(2013	and	2017),	which	showed	that	a	multiplex	model	better	fits	the	different	characteristics	
of	maritime	transportation,	as	well	as	with	those	of	Cardillo	et	al.	(2013),	which	showed	that	a	multiplex	
model	can	better	evidence	the	different	structures	of	transport	companies’	networks.	However,	this	
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paper	provides	an	important	contribution	to	the	literature	by	analysing	the	multiple	layers	of	the	
maritime	network	based	on	the	different	liner	shipping	companies’	strategies,	an	analysis	that	to	date	
has	been	missing.		
For	the	liner	shipping	networks	analysed	here,	results	suggested	there	were	networks	as	large	as	CMA-
CGM’s	(29	nodes,	167	links),	and	as	small	as	COSCO’s	(4	nodes,	5	links).	Some	networks	were	more	
dense	than	the	MSN	(e.g.	CSAV,	Cosco,	Hamburg-Süd),	while	others	were	less	dense	(e.g.	APL,	
Evergreen,	NYK)	(Table	3).	Average	connectivity	opportunities	at	the	node	level	(beta	index)	in	the	
networks	of	CMA-CGM,	CSAV,	Hamburg-Süd	and	Maersk	more	than	doubled	those	in	APL,	COSCO,	MOL	
and	ZIM.	Likewise,	there	were	networks	more	clustered	than	the	MSN	(e.g.	APL,	MSC),	while	others	
presented	a	very	low	level	of	clustering	(e.g.	COSCO,	ZIM)	(Table	3).	The	differences	in	terms	of	network	
completeness	would	suggest	that	liner	shipping	networks	have	different	degrees	of	vulnerability.	This	
will	be	discussed	later	when	we	present	the	results	of	the	simulations.	In	turn,	network	visualisation	and	
the	betwenness	centrality	metrics	showed	that	nodes	occupied	different	positions	in	each	network	
(Figure	5).	For	example,	the	US	and	Panama	played	key	roles	in	the	APL	network;	Colombia	and	Trinidad	
and	Tobago	were	central	nodes	in	the	CMA-CGM	network;	and	Brazil	and	Jamaica	were	critical	in	the	
ZIM	network.	Moreover,	the	most	important	links	in	the	networks	in	terms	of	capacity	did	not	match	
either.	For	example,	while	the	link	between	US	and	Panama	had	the	highest	weight	in	the	APL,	
Evergreen,	Maersk,	and	MOL	networks,	it	had	little	importance	in	the	CSAV,	Hamburg-Sud,	MSC,	and	
NYK	networks	(Figure	5).	As	is	shown	below,	these	differences	determined	how	dependent	and	
vulnerable	liner	shipping	networks	were	to	simulated	attacks.		
Further	analysis	of	the	multiplex	liner	shipping	network	in	the	Americas	showed	that	certain	countries	
had	higher	dependency	from	specific	liner	shipping	companies.	This	was	because	either	a	low	number	of	
companies	called	at	their	ports	and/or	a	reduced	number	of	companies	provided	a	large	share	of	
available	capacity	for	such	countries.	For	example,	in	the	case	of	Jamaica,	one	shipping	line	(ZIM)	
provided	near	40%	of	available	capacity.	Together	with	CMA-CGM	(21%)	and	CSAV	(20%),	three	shipping	
lines	provided	80%	of	available	capacity.	In	the	case	of	DR,	two	shipping	lines	provided	52%	of	available	
capacity:	MSC	(28%)	and	CSAV	(24%).	In	the	case	of	Chile,	three	shipping	lines	provided	nearly	two-
thirds	of	available	capacity:	CSAV	(26%),	Hamburg-Süd	(19%)	and	MSC	(18%).	Likewise,	in	the	case	of	
Costa	Rica	and	Honduras	three	lines	provided	up	to	two-thirds	of	available	capacity.	For	Costa	Rica,	
these	companies	were:	CMA-CGM	(13.3%),	CSAV	(29.3%)	and	Maersk	(23.6%).	For	Honduras,	the	
companies	were:	Seaboard	(25.8%),	CMA-CGM	(19%)	and	CLS	(18.3%).	As	a	result,	international	freight	
flows	from	these	countries	depended	on	the	port	choice	decisions	of	the	liner	shipping	companies	
calling	at	their	ports.	For	example,	exports	of	electronic	and	pharmaceutical	products	from	Costa	Rica	
mostly	depended	on	the	business	strategies	and	network	performance	of	CMA-CGM,	CSAV	and	Maersk	
to	reach	their	buyers	in	the	US.		
The	analysis	of	the	multiplex	liner	shipping	network	in	the	Americas	also	showed	that	certain	
maritime/geographic	areas	were	highly	dependent	upon	specific	liner	shipping	companies.	In	the	case	of	
WCSA,	three	shipping	lines	provided	60%	of	available	capacity:	CSAV	(25%),	Hamburg-Süd	(19%)	and	
MSC	(18%).	In	the	case	of	the	Southern	Cone,	although	it	was	much	less	concentrated	than	the	WCSA,	
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four	shipping	lines	accounted	for	60%	of	total	TEUs	available	for	the	area.	In	the	west	coast	of	Central	
America	(WCCA),	one	shipping	line	(Hamburg-Süd)	provided	42%	of	available	capacity.	When	
considering	the	two	main	liner	shipping	companies	in	the	area	(including	CSAV,	22%),	they	accounted	for	
nearly	two-thirds	of	available	capacity.	Finally,	in	the	Caribbean	two	shipping	lines	provided	two-thirds	
of	available	capacity:	CMA-CGM	(32%)	and	CSAV	(34%).	The	only	exception	on	liner	company	
dependency	was	the	east	coast	of	Central	America	(ECCA),	where	with	4	shipping	lines	providing	50%	of	
available	capacity,	lower	concentration	was	evident.		
Taking	into	account	the	configuration	of	the	maritime	shipping	networks,	we	next	analysed	how	
vulnerable	freight	flows	from	a	given	country	were	to	events	disrupting	the	network	of	shipping	services	
in	the	Americas,	even	if	those	events	occurred	in	third	countries.	Similar	to	the	case	of	the	MSN,	the	
hub-and-spoke	strategies	adopted	by	the	shipping	lines	create	a	hierarchy	among	ports,	with	hub	ports	
having	a	pivotal	role	for	the	overall	connectivity	of	each	shipping	network.	This	corresponds	to	the	fact	
that	the	main	shipping	lines	in	the	Americas	are	also	major	international	players	with	global	shipping	
strategies,	which	use	hub-and-spoke	networks	to	improve	their	global	efficiency	and	profitability	
(McCalla	et	al.,	2005;	Fremont,	2007).	Such	a	strategy	can	be	evidenced	in	the	different	network	
configurations	shown	in	Figure	5.	This	is	particularly	evidenced	through	the	higher	betweenness	
centrality	of	a	small	number	of	nodes	in	each	of	the	individual	liner	shipping	networks.	For	example,	in	
the	case	of	the	CMA-CGM	network,	the	hubs	in	the	Americas	are	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	Colombia	and	
Jamaica;	for	Evergreen,	the	hubs	are	Panama	and	the	US;	for	Maersk,	Panama;	for	MOL,	Panama	and	
Brazil;	and	for	ZIM,	Jamaica	and	Brazil.		
In	line	with	available	evidence	on	complex	networks	(Albert	et	al.,	2000;	Woolley-Meza	et	al.,	2011),	
results	from	the	70	simulations	conducted	showed	that,	in	a	hub-and-spoke	strategy,	the	vulnerability	of	
the	network	depends	on	which	node	is	attacked.	In	addition,	the	specific	position	of	a	node	in	a	network	
made	it	more	or	less	exposed	to	attacks	in	other	nodes	or	parts	of	the	network.	For	example,	since	
Jamaica	was	a	critical	hub	for	the	ZIM	network,	the	simulated	attack	to	this	country	led	to	a	significant	
damage	to	ZIM’s	network,	with	a	significant	reduction	of	links	and	nodes	in	the	network	compared	to	
the	simulated	attacks	to	other	countries.	This	is	graphically	illustrated	in	Figure	6.	The	results	of	the	
other	70	networks	generated	through	the	simulations	are	reported	here	but	not	illustrated	due	to	space	
limitations.	Instead,	the	simulated	attack	to	Jamaica	had	little	impact	on	the	NYK	network	since	it	was	a	
peripheral	node	in	the	NYK	network,	and	had	no	importance	at	all	for	the	MSC	network,	since	Jamaica	
was	absent	from	such	network.	Likewise,	Evergreen’s	network	was	significantly	affected	by	the	
simulated	attack	to	Panama,	when	it	lost	85%	of	its	links,	but	was	largely	unaffected	by	the	attack	to	
Brazil,	when	it	lost	less	than	1%	of	its	links	(Table	4).	
As	a	consequence	of	the	different	roles	countries	had	in	each	liner	shipping	network,	simulated	attacks	
to	the	countries	selected	had	different	impacts.	For	example,	when	taking	into	account	total	number	of	
links	lost	with	the	removal	of	a	selected	country	from	the	network	–	or	the	decrease	in	network	
completeness	–,	results	showed	that	a	failure	in	Brazil	affected	more	the	MOL	network	than	any	other	
shipping	company	network;	Colombia	affected	more	the	Hamburg-Süd	network;	DR	affected	more	the	
MSC	network;	Jamaica	affected	more	the	ZIM	network;	Panama	affected	more	the	Evergreen	network;	
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Trinidad	and	Tobago	affected	more	the	CMA-CGM	network;	and	the	US	affected	more	the	COSCO	and	
NYK	networks	than	any	other	shipping	company	network	(Table	4).	These	results	can	provide	an	
important	insight	to	both	international	trade	and	supply	chain	risk	management	strategies.	Due	to	the	
fact	that	the	structure	of	shipping	routes	does	not	entirely	overlap	trade	patterns	(Ducruet	and	
Notteboom,	2012;	Calatayud	et	al.,	2017),	often	exports	from	a	given	country	have	to	go	through	
intermediary	ports	and	countries	–	either	because	of	the	service	routing	or	the	need	for	transhipment	–	
before	arriving	at	destination.	Therefore,	business	environment	and	the	performance	of	ports	in	
intermediary	ports	and	countries	can	certainly	impact	the	smooth	flow	of	goods	among	international	
trade	partners.	In	this	context,	results	show	that	international	freight	flows	from	countries	located	in	
maritime	regions	with	higher	dependency	on,	for	example,	CMA-CGM	services	–	e.g.	Jamaica	or	the	
Caribbean	community	–,	could	be	affected	should	disruptions	occur	at	Port	of	Spain	in	Trinidad	and	
Tobago.	Likewise,	international	freight	flows	from	countries	with	higher	dependency	on	Hamburg-Süd	
services,	such	as	Chile,	could	be	at	risk	from	disruptions	to	the	ports	of	Buenaventura	and	Cartagena	in	
Colombia.	
	
Figure	6.	Simulated	attacks	to	selected	countries	and	impact	on	ZIM’s	network*	
PLEASE	CITE	THIS	PAPER	AS	Calatayud,	A.,	Mangan,	J.	and	Palacin,	R.	(2017)	'Vulnerability	of	
international	freight	flows	to	shipping	network	disruptions:	A	multiplex	network	perspective',	
Transportation	Research	Part	E:	Logistics	and	Transportation	Review,	108,	pp.	195-208.	
	
18	
	
*Nodes’size	and	labels	size	according	to	betweenness	centrality.	Links	weight	according	to	weight	of	connections	
between	countries.	Links	colour	according	to	community.		
	
	 %	change	
no	Brazil		
%	change	no	
Colombia		
%	change	
no	DR	
%	change	
no	Jamaica	
%	change	
no	Panama	
%	change	
no	T&T	
%	change	
no	US	
MSN	all	 -12	 -19.3	 -11.5	 -17.8	 -21.6	 -29.3	 -38.7	
APL	 -	 -18.8	 -9.4	 -	 -59.4	 -	 -40.6	
CMA-CGM	 -1	 -55.1	 -16.2	 -38.3	 -25.1	 -41.3	 -18.6	
Cosco	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -60	 -	 -80	
CSAV	 -26.1	 -50.5	 -32.4	 -17.1	 -25.2	 -	 -36	
Evergreen	 -9.6	 -40.4	 -15.4	 -17.3	 -84.6	 -	 -21.2	
Hamburg-Süd	 -14.4	 -83.5	 -14.4	 -7.2	 -40.2	 -11.3	 -33	
Hapag-Lloyd	 -15.7	 -56.9	 -30.4	 -	 -44.1	 -15.7	 -43.1	
Maersk	 -27.4	 -36.8	 -6.8	 -14.5	 -64.1	 -23.9	 -65.8	
MOL	 -45.5	 -	 -	 -	 -59.1	 -13.6	 -9.1	
MSC	 -30	 -	 -42.5	 -	 -42.5	 -	 -57.5	
NYK	 -29.8	 -38.3	 -17	 -2.1	 -12.8	 -	 -72.3	
ZIM	 -33.3	 -	 -	 -71.4	 -23.8	 -	 -42.9	
Table	4.	Impact	of	attacks	on	networks	size	(links)*	
*Cells	highlighted	in	grey	indicate	the	liner	shipping	network	that	was	impacted	the	most	when	a	given	country	
was	attacked,	as	a	function	of	the	percentage	of	links	the	liner	shipping	network	lost.	
	
We	applied	the	network	metrics	selected	and	summarised	in	Table	2	to	analyse	the	impact	of	targeted	
attacks	on	the	MSN	and	the	individual	liner	shipping	networks.	A	lower	number	of	total	links,	a	higher	
network	diameter,	and	lower	beta	and	gamma	indices	indicate	a	negative	effect	of	the	targeted	attack	
on	network	connectivity,	therefore	making	it	more	difficult	to	reach	nodes	in	the	network.	A	lower	
clustering	coefficient	indicates	a	negative	impact	of	the	attack	on	network	concentration,	thus	
decreasing	the	density	of	ties	between	nodes	in	a	network.	At	the	global	level	of	the	MSN,	among	all	the	
simulations	conducted	it	was	an	attack	to	the	US	which	had	the	highest	impact	on	the	network	(Figure	
7).	Due	to	the	role	that	the	US	had	in	the	MSN	as	global	connector,	removing	this	country	from	the	
network	substantially	reduced	global	connectivity	and	network	size.	In	fact,	the	total	number	of	links	
decreased	by	nearly	40%,	the	beta	index	by	31%,	and	the	gamma	index	by	21%.	In	turn,	network	
diameter	increased	by	33%	and	clustering	coefficient	by	38%.	Surprisingly,	the	country	that	had	the	
second	most	important	impact	on	the	MSN	when	it	was	removed	from	the	network	was	Trinidad	and	
Tobago	(Figure	8):	links	decreased	by	29%	and	the	beta	index	by	17%.	Network	diameter	increased	by	
33%	and	clustering	coefficient	by	23%.	Looking	closer	to	the	MSN	structure,	the	relevance	of	Trinidad	
and	Tobago	for	global	connectivity	is	explained	by	the	critical	role	the	country	played	as	a	connector	for	
the	Caribbean	and	Southern	Cone	communities	to	the	rest	of	the	network.	Overall,	these	results	imply	
that	countries	that	are	international	trade	partners,	and	global	supply	chains	with	nodes	in	the	Americas	
that	involve	products	moving	in	maritime	containers,	should	include	in	their	risk	assessments	an	
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evaluation	of	the	extent	to	which	they	may	be	exposed	to	risks	of	delays	or	disruptions	should	ports	in	
the	main	hubs	be	closed	due	to	adverse	weather	conditions,	strikes,	national	threats,	etc.		
When	analysing	the	impact	of	the	simulated	attacks	on	the	connectivity	of	each	of	the	32	countries,	
results	showed	that	the	countries	with	highest	vulnerability	(in	terms	of	loss	of	20%	of	total	number	of	
links	or	more)	were:	Argentina	–	whose	connectivity	was	highly	impacted	by	attacks	on	five	of	the	
selected	countries	–	followed	by	Haiti,	Suriname	and	Uruguay,	whose	connectivity	was	impacted	by	
attacks	on	four	countries.	Instead,	the	countries	with	the	highest	resilience	were	Brazil,	Colombia,	DR,	
Guatemala,	Mexico,	and	the	US,	whose	connectivity	went	below	the	threshold	of	20%	of	links	lost	just	
once	among	the	different	simulations	conducted.	This	suggests	that	international	freight	flows	from	the	
first	group	of	countries	could	be	more	exposed	to	risks	of	disruptions	in	maritime	shipping	services	than	
international	freight	flows	from	the	second	group	of	countries,	which	would	see	their	flow	of	products	
less	affected	by	disruptions	in	the	MSN.		
	
								(i)																																																																																																					(ii)	
Figure	7.	Simulated	attack	to	the	US	and	impact	on	the	MSN*	
*Nodes’size	and	labels	size	according	to	betweenness	centrality.	Links	weight	according	to	weight	of	connections	
between	countries.	Links	colour	according	to	community.	(i)	Before	the	attack;	(ii)	after	the	attack.	
	
	
								(i)																																																																																																					(ii)	
Figure	8.	Simulated	attack	to	Trinidad	and	Tobago	and	impact	the	MSN*	
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*Nodes’size	and	labels	size	according	to	betweenness	centrality.	Links	weight	according	to	weight	of	connections	
between	countries.	Links	colour	according	to	community.	(i)	Before	the	attack;	(ii)	after	the	attack.	
	
Communities	showed	different	degrees	of	vulnerability	according	to	the	shipping	line	serving	them	and	
the	role	neighbours	in	the	community	and	hubs	played	in	the	liner	shipping	network.	For	example,	
WCSA	depended	on	the	services	from	three	main	shipping	lines:	CSAV	(25%),	Hamburg-Süd	(19%)	and	
MSC	(18%).	According	to	the	results	shown	in	Table	4	regarding	the	number	of	total	links	lost	after	an	
attack,	in	the	case	of	CSAV,	services	were	more	vulnerable	to	disruptions	in	Colombia	and	Brazil.	In	the	
case	of	Hamburg-Süd,	services	were	more	vulnerable	to	attacks	to	Colombia	and	the	US.	Finally,	in	the	
case	of	MSC,	services	were	more	vulnerable	to	disruptions	in	Brazil,	DR	and	the	US.	The	Southern	Cone	
community	revealed	a	significant	exposure	to	disruption	in	many	countries,	such	as	Brazil,	Trinidad	and	
Tobago,	DR	and	Jamaica,	suggesting	high	vulnerability	to	events	occurring	in	different	network	hubs,	
even	in	those	geographically	located	far	from	the	community.	As	a	consequence	of	attacks	to	different	
countries,	countries	in	the	Southern	Cone	were	cut	off	or	disappeared	from	the	network.	In	the	case	of	
WCCA,	two	shipping	lines	provided	64%	of	available	connections:	Hamburg-Süd	(42%)	and	CSAV	(22%).	
Because	of	this,	the	community	was	particularly	vulnerable	to	disruptions	in	Colombia,	due	to	the	
configuration	of	both	liner	shipping	networks.	In	the	Caribbean	two	shipping	lines	provided	two	thirds	of	
available	capacity:	CMA-CGM	(32%)	and	CSAV	(34%).	Therefore,	the	community	was	more	vulnerable	to	
disruptions	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	(due	to	the	special	role	this	country	had	in	the	CMA-CGM	network)	
and	Jamaica	(because	of	the	role	that	the	country	had	in	the	CSAV	network).		
Likewise,	countries	showed	different	levels	of	vulnerability	to	the	simulated	attacks	according	to	the	
liner	shipping	companies	calling	at	their	ports	and	the	structure	of	the	companies’	networks.	For	
example,	given	that	Jamaica	was	mainly	served	by	ZIM	(37%),	CMA-CGM	(21%)	and	CSAV	(20%)	services,	
the	firms	located	in	this	country	were	particularly	exposed	to	the	attacks	in	Brazil	(see	Figure	6	where	
the	effect	of	an	attack	on	Brazil	is	illustrated,	disrupting	the	services	to	the	Southern	Cone	community)	
and	in	Colombia.	In	the	case	of	the	firms	located	in	DR,	they	were	more	vulnerable	to	disruptions	in	
Brazil,	Panama	and	the	US	because	of	the	importance	that	MSC	services	(28%)	had	in	DR’s	total	shipping	
services,	and	Brazil,	Colombia	and	the	US	in	the	case	of	CSAV	services	(24%	of	total	DR’s	services).	Being	
served	by	CSAV	(26%),	Hamburg-Süd	(19%),	and	MSC	(18%),	Chile	proved	to	be	vulnerable	to	disruptions	
in	Colombia	and	Panama.	In	the	case	of	Argentina	and	Uruguay,	these	countries	proved	to	be	highly	
dependent	and	vulnerable	to	shocks	in	Brazil.	These	results	suggest	that	firms	located	in	Chile,	for	
example,	should	assess	to	what	extent	their	operations	may	be	exposed	to	disruptions	at	ports	in	
Colombia	and	Panama,	as	well	as	to	the	networks	of	CSAV,	Hamburg-Süd	and	MSC	shipping	lines.		
Overall,	the	results	of	this	paper	evidence	the	importance	of	taking	into	account	the	structure	of	
maritime	networks	as	a	source	of	risk	for	international	freight	flows	and	global	supply	chains.	Indeed,	
due	to	the	configuration	of	shipping	networks,	containerships	usually	call	at	ports	in	neighbouring	
countries,	and	regional	or	global	hubs	before	arriving	to	destination.	Therefore,	from	a	risk	management	
perspective,	the	performance	of	ports	and	the	business	environment	in	intermediate	countries	can	
impact	the	smooth	flow	of	freight	among	international	trade	partners.	In	addition,	the	high	market	
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concentration	by	shipping	lines	serving	a	particular	country	is	another	source	of	risk.	For	the	various	
stakeholders	interested	in	the	movement	of	freight	using	international	shipping	networks,	awareness	
should	be	the	first	step	to	mitigate	risk	from	shipping	line	networks.	Further	actions	for	supply	chain	
managers	should	include	improving	visibility	and	supply	chain	integration	with	not	just	port	operators,	
as	suggested	by	the	literature	(Panayides	and	Song,	2008),	but	also	with	liner	companies.	This	is	even	
more	important	in	a	situation	where	liner	companies	are	increasingly	integrating	vertically	with	ports	
and	land	transportation	companies	and	becoming	logistics	service	providers	(Fremont	and	Soppe,	2004).	
As	part	of	the	risk	mitigation	actions	and	visibility	improvement	in	the	maritime	legs	of	supply	chains,	
early	warning	systems	could	be	implemented	in	order	to	identify	potentially	disruptive	events	in	both	
intermediary	countries	and	shipping	lines,	and	enhance	preparedness	and	response	capabilities.	From	
the	policy	perspective,	actions	could	include	fostering	investment	for	a	more	efficient	and	resilient	port	
infrastructure,	as	well	as	increasing	dialogue	and	cooperation	with	other	countries	in	the	Americas	as	a	
means	to	coordinate	efforts	around	infrastructure	investment,	connectivity,	regulation	and	trade	
facilitation,	and	emergency	preparedness.	
	
5. Conclusion	
Using	multiple	network	modelling	and	analysis,	this	paper	provided	evidence	that	the	structure	of	the	
multi-layered	maritime	shipping	network	created	different	levels	of	vulnerability	for	international	freight	
flows,	according	to	the	different	positions	countries	occupied	in	the	network.	In	line	with	available	
literature	in	the	transportation	field,	it	was	shown	that	a	multiplex	model	better	represents	the	real	
situation,	as	it	can	more	effectively	illustrate	the	different	structures	of	liner	companies’	networks.	As	
supply	chains	become	more	international	and	complex,	with	partners	located	in	different	countries	and	
subject	to	different	business	environments,	dependence	on	maritime	transportation	and	shipping	
strategies	increases,	along	with	the	risks	to	disruptions	in	such	networks.	Given	the	challenges	that	
these	disruptions	pose	to	supply	chain	performance	and	management,	firms	should	be	aware	of	how	a	
given	country’s	position	in	the	MSN	and	the	strategies	of	the	liner	shipping	companies	servicing	it	can	
impact	them	and	include	this	factor	in	their	supply	chain	risk	management	strategies.	In	this	context,	risk	
mitigation	actions	should	seek	to	increase	visibility	and	integration	with	liner	companies.	Early	warning	
systems	can	identify	possible	problems	in	intermediate	countries	and	shipping	lines,	and	provide	supply	
chain	partners	with	wider	margins	of	time	and	ability	to	maneuver	so	as	to	avoid	or,	at	least,	minimize	
disruptions	in	the	chain.		
Furthermore,	the	results	of	this	research	can	be	useful	for	policy-making.	A	country’s	transport	and	
trade	strategies	cannot	be	designed	in	isolation	from	the	transport	contexts	(or	networks)	the	country	is	
embedded	in	-	such	strategies	need	to	acknowledge	the	level	of	dependency	from	other	actors	and	be	
able	to	minimise	the	resulting	risks.	Although	governments	can	only	moderately	influence	the	strategies	
of	liner	shipping	companies,	they	can	play	an	important	role	in	facilitating	actions	to	mitigate	the	risks	of	
international	trade	disruptions.	For	example,	they	can	set	the	standards	for	and/or	provide	
infrastructure	resilient	to	natural	disasters.	They	can	also	endeavor	to	provide	liner	companies	with	a	
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predictable	business	environment	and	legal	frameworks	under	which	operate.	Given	the	
interdependency	of	countries	in	the	MSN,	governments	can	also	develop	strategies	at	the	wider	regional	
/	pan	national	level	as	a	means	to	coordinate	efforts	around	investment,	regulation	and	trade	
facilitation,	and	security	/	preparedness.		
Further	research	could	focus	on	collecting	data	for	a	broader	period	of	time	in	order	to	analyse	any	
variation	over	time	in	liner	shipping	strategies	as	well	as	the	countries’	position	in	the	multi-layered	
maritime	transport	network.	Further	research	could	also	focus	on	applying	the	proposed	approach	to	
other	regions	or	country	groups,	and	to	the	individual	ports	in	the	network.	This	would	enable	
comparison	of	dependency	and	vulnerability	levels	among	different	regions,	country	groups	or	ports,	as	
well	as	provision	of	input	for	decision-making	concerning	policy-makers	and	global	supply	chains	
operating	in	a	broader	group	of	countries.	Another	area	for	future	investigations	could	be	the	likelihood	
of	an	economy	or	a	port	of	suffering	from	disruptions	in	shipping	services.	Finally,	research	could	also	
focus	on	identifying	policy	and	regulatory	actions	that	mitigate	vulnerability	from	liner	shipping	
disruptions	and,	in	general,	the	relation	between	network	regulation	policy	and	vulnerability	in	this	and	
other	sectors.	
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[1]	Argentina,	Antigua	and	Barbuda,	Bahamas,	Belize,	Brazil,	Barbados,	Canada,	Chile,	Colombia,	Costa	Rica,	
Dominica,	Dominican	Republic	(DR),	Ecuador,	Grenada,	Guatemala,	Guyana,	Haiti,	Honduras,	Jamaica,	St.	Kitts	and	
Nevis,	St.	Lucia,	St.	Vincent	and	the	Grenadines,	Mexico,	Nicaragua,	Panama,	Peru,	El	Salvador,	Suriname,	Trinidad	
and	Tobago,	Uruguay,	United	States	(US),	Venezuela.	Bolivia	and	Paraguay	were	excluded	from	the	sample	
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